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DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: THE EFFECTS OF EX ANTE
VERSUS EX POST CONTRACTING
Amitraj eet A. Batabyal

ABSTRACT

In the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, developing countries (DCs) were adamant that, in order to
protect the environment for the future, new institutions were needed which would channel resources
from the wealthy developed countries to the poor DCs. With this backdrop, I analyze the problem
faced by an asymmetrically informed supranational governmental authority (SNGA) who wishes
to design an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). The SNGA cannot contract directly
with polluting firms in the various DCs; instead, he must deal with such firms through their
governments. I study this tripartite hierarchical interaction and focus on the properties of the
optimal ex ante and ex post IEAs, which can be implemented by the SNGA in two different
scenarios. My analysis suggests that IEAs are not inherently doomed due to a basic monitoring and
enforcement problem stemming from national sovereignty. Further, desirable levels of pollution
abatement can result in a number of contractual settings.
j
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DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: THE EFFECTS OF EX ANTE
VERSUS EX POST CONTRACTING l

1. Introduction

With the passage of time, it has increasingly been recognized that environmental protection
is a global issue. The significance of this issue has been amply demonstrated by the events of the
1992 Rio Earth Summit. At this Summit, it became clear that if the developed countries of the world

wanted " . . . the environment to be secured for future generations, [then they would] have to
radically assist the South in choosing a different road to development than the one they [had]
currently [been] travelling on" (Rogers, 1993, p. 27). Indeed, to combat the evils of poverty and
environmental degradation, developing countries (Des) have demanded the transfer of resources
from developed countries. In such a contentious setting, the success or failure to protect the
environment will depend crucially on the ability of international organizations to craft effective
international environmental agreements (IEAs).2 Given this, a key question becomes "How can
international institutions, which necessarily respect the principle of state sovereignty, contribute to
the solution ofd~cu1t global problems?" (Keohane, Haas, and Levy, 1993, p. 6). This is the central
question that I propose to analyze in this paper.
On the academic front, researchers ·have begun to study Issues relating to global

II have benefited from the comments of Larry Karp, Stefan Reichelstein, and seminar participants at Dartmouth
College, Resources for the Future, UC Riverside, University of Guelph, University of Toronto, and the 1994 winter
meetings of the North American Econometric Society. I acknowledge financial support from the Giannini Foundation,
the Faculty Research Grant program at Utah State University, and the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station, Utah State
University, Logan, UT 84322-4810, by way of project UTA 024. Approved as journal paper No. 5014. The usual
disclaimer applies.

2In this paper I shall use the tenns lEA and contract interchangeably.
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environmental protection in a systematic manner only very recently.3 As a result, many specific
questions remain unanswered. What kinds of pollution abatement patterns can one expect to observe
in situations in which an imperfectly informed supranational governmental authority (SNGA)
contracts with governments and polluting firms in individual countries? What kinds of monetary
transfers will be necessary to get sovereign nations to voluntarily participate in IEA's? What is the
effect of contractual procedure, i.e., ex ante versus ex post contracting4 on the nature of pollution
abatement patterns across countries? Finally, how does the SNGA's inability to monitor pollution
abatement in the individual countries affect the IEA design question? These are some of the specific
questions that I shall address in this paper.
In particular, I shall build on the economics of hierarchies to study the global pollution
control question as a problem in mechanism design. 5 This perspective not only highlights the effect
of key informational asymmetries on the design of contracts, but it also provides insights into the
kinds of pollution control arrangements one might expect to observe in an inherently hierarchical
and noncooperative international environment. As far as the regional aspects of this pollution
control question are concerned, there are two issues to note. The first issue concerns the potentially
deleterious effects of excessive compliance costs stemming from multiple levels of regulations.
Second, there is the possibility that regions (nations) will compete among themselves to attract

3See Keohane, Haas, and Levy (1993) for a more detailed corroboration of this claim.
48y ex ante, I mean contracting that takes place with all parties holding symmetric but imperfect information
about the pollution abatement technology of fIrms. By ex post, I mean contracting that takes place with the parties
holding asymmetric information about the pollution abatement technology of the same fIrms.
5For more on hierarchical analyses in regional science, see Kohsaka (1986), West, Ryan, and von Hohenbalken
(1988), and CrihfIeld and Panggabean (1996).
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business investment by weakening their regulatory requirements. 6 With regard to these two issues,
my hierarchical approach implicitly sides with those who have called for a centralized approach to
environmental regulation (see Peltzman and Tideman (1972), Cumberland (1979, 1981), and
Markusen, Morey, and Olewiler (1993, 1995)).
Although my analysis is, in principle, applicable to any country, the hierarchical interaction
that I shall analyze is particularly relevant to DCs; as such, the reader should note that it is these
countries that I have in mind in all of the subsequent analyses. 7

2. International Environmental Agreements: A Brief Synopsis

Barrett (1994) has modeled IEAs as games between countries. While Barrett's analyses are
not in the design framework, he makes the important point that for IEAs to work at all, they must
be self-enforcing. Hoel (1992) argues against the institution of uniform emissions reduction policies
in international agreements, showing that other policies yield higher levels of global welfare.
Petrakis and Xepapadeas (1996) show that a large enough group of environmentally conscious
countries can make self-financing side payments to a group of less environmentally conscious
countries so as to produce a stable coalition which leads to lower overall pollution emissions. While
these papers have certainly advanced our understanding of some aspects of". . . the multi-faceted
design . .. problem," (Black, Levi, and de Meza, 1993, p. 281), many other important questions,

6Closely related to this issue is the "industrial flight" hypothesis. This hypothesis says that firms in developed
countries will attempt to take advantage of lower environmental standards in developing countries by relocating to such
countries. The relevance of this hypothesis for the design of IEAs and the extent to which this hypothesis is true is the
subject of debate. For more on this matter, see Weidenbaum (1980), Leonard (1984), and Kleindorfer, Kunreuther, and
Hong (1996).
7The countries I have in mind are those which would be eligible to receive monetary transfers under the Global
Environmental Facility' s (GEF) standard of per capita income of $4,000 or less. For more details, see Rogers (1993 ,
p. 155).
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which I discussed in section 1, remain unanswered. As such, I now discuss my modeling approach
to the IEA design question.
I shall model the international environment as a multi-forked, three-tiered hierarchy.
Occupying the top tier of the hierarchy is the relevant international institution, which I shall call a
SNGA. This SNGA could be an organization such as the World Bank, 8 or the Commission on
Sustainable Development (CSD) created in Agenda 21 at the Rio Earth Summit. The second and
third tiers of the hierarchy consist of the government and a representative polluting firm in each DC.
Each fork of the hierarchy corresponds to a single DC, and there are N such forks/countries .9
Three-tiered hierarchies have been studied by Tirole (1986), Kofman and Lawarree (1993), and
Batabyal (1996, forthcoming) . Batabyal (forthcoming) compares a two-tiered hierarchy with a
three-tiered hierarchy and shows that IEAs are greatly affected by the existence of budget balance
and pollution reduction ceiling constraints negotiated by the SNGA and a DC government.
However, to the best of my knowledge, the problem of ex ante versus ex post contracting with
possible government/firm collusion has not been studied to date.
As such, I shall apply the theory of hierarchies to study ex ante and ex post contracting
between the SNGA, national governments, and polluting firms in the various countries. The
rationale for such contracting stems from issues such as the harmful atmospheric effects of carbon

8Specifically in its role as an administrator of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) .
9The reader will note that in this modeling scheme, I have conferred, on the SNGA, the role of principal. As
such, there is a distinct asymmetry in the assumed power of the SNGA as opposed to that of governments and firms.
Given that I am interested in DCs, which typically have limited bargaining power in their dealings with international
institutions owing to the fact that their monetary contributions to the budgets of such organizations are minimal, this
hierarchical modeling scheme would appear to be appropriate. For more on the power of SNGAs over DCs, see Mosley,
Harrigan, and Toye (1991).

5

dioxide and/or nitrogen emissions. The incidence of pollution may be domestic or transboundary.l0
The key element of uncertainty stems from the SNGA's lack of knowledge about the pollution
abatement technology/capability available in each country.

This lack of knowledge about

abatement capability is the source of imperfect information. Whereas the firm in the DC always
knows its technology and the government does too in some states of nature, the SNGA is never privy
to this information.

The random variable denoting the private information about pollution

abatement capability is uncorrelated across countries. My analysis holds for any finite set of
countries, with the SNGAIgovernment/firm interaction in one country being independent of the
SNGA's dealings with some other country. Hence, without loss of generality, I shall focus on an
arbitrary country, say j, in the finite set of countries. The SNGA's task is to design incentive
compatible and collusion-proof ex ante and ex post lEAs, which can be implemented in a
Bayes-Nash equilibrium. 11
The rest of this paper is organized as follows . In section 3, I describe the model in detail,
and I study the properties of the first-best optimum. In section 4, I study ex ante and ex post
contracting, with no collusion by the firm and the government. In section 5, I study ex ante and ex

post contracting with possible collusion by the government and the representative polluting firm.
The ex ante versus ex post distinction is important. Theoretically, this distinction reflects the
symmetric (but imperfect) information versus asymmetric information cases. In a practical setting,
the relevant issue concerns the possible need to limit the ex post liability of the players in the various

lOSee Crane (1993) and P aar1berg (1993) for a discussion of the relevance of international institutions when the
incidence of an environmental externality is domestic.
IlBecause I am analyzing a Bayesian game, i.e. , a static game of incomplete information, the appropriate
equilibrium concept is that of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. This is standard usage in game theory. For more details, see
Gibbons (1992, Chapter 3).
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nations in order to get them to voluntarily participate in the IEA. Thus, we can think of ex post
contracting as a case of contracting with limited liability constraints. Alternately, we can think of
the ex ante versus ex post distinction as a reflection of the power of the SNGA. If the SNGA is
sufficiently powerful to get a country to contract before the resolution of the uncertainty regarding
pollution abatement capability, then the contract is ex ante. Presumably, this is what an SNGA
would like to do. However, it is possible that some countries will refuse to participate until the
resolution of the uncertainty because ex ante participation might result in losses to polluting firms.
In this case, an individually rational contract will be ex post.
The reasons for studying collusion between the polluting firm and the DC government are
threefold . First, while the DC government participates in the IEA because it recognizes the value
of such international participation, this government also acts as the polluting firm's advocate. This
aspect of the problem will give rise to scenarios in which government/firm collusion becomes a
desirable option.12 Second, the government and the firm receive monetary transfers from the SNGA
for their roles in abating pollution. Further, both of these players know that the SNGA cannot
monitor their activities owing to sovereignty or, for that matter, enforce the terms of the IEA in the
event of a contractual breach. As such, there will be circumstances in which there are incentives for
the government and the firm in each country to collude to maximize the transfers received from the
SNGA. Third, as Mookherjee and Png (1995) have noted, corruption is an endemic part of public
life in many developing countries. This suggests a need for explicitly modeling the activities of
potentially corruptible players. Due to these three reasons, an important part of this paper will

12See Peterson (1993) for a discussion of some instances of possible governmentJfmn collusion in an
international setting.
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consist of analyzing collusion-proof contracts. 13

3. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Description of the Model
Subscript i = 1,2,3,4 will refer to the state of nature, and superscript) = 1, ... , N will refer
to the country. 8 denotes the uncertainty about the pollution abatement technology/capability that
is currently available; 8 has binary support

[8,

e], where °< ()

refer to () as the low-abatement capability parameter and to

<

8,

and Lf}

==

e- 8.

I shall

8 as the high-abatement capability

parameter.
The risk-averse firm produces clean air, whose output and value are denoted by x, XEJR+.
This firm chooses abatement a, aEJR++ . The firm's cost of abatement is g(a), where g /(-) > 0,

g /{ -) > 0, and g(O) = 0.
B[Ti - g(aJ] with B

The firm has a differentiable net payoff from abatement function

1- ]E(O, 00), Vi.

I:EJR is the state i monetary transfer made by the SNGA to the

finn for abating pollution. The firm's reservation payoff is Br = B[Tr], and Tr

~

°

is the reservation

transfer. Brand Tr are common knowledge.
The DC government is risk-averse; it has a strictly concave and differentiable utility function

V(G i ), where GjEJR+ is the state i monetary transfer made by the SNGA to the government for
participating in the lEA. The government's reservation utility is Vr = V(G r), where GrEJR+ is the
reservation transfer, and V/(Gi)E(O, 00), VG i. By employing a monitoring device, the government
receives a signal, s, from the firm regarding its private information and then it sends a report, r, to

13r do not discuss the manner in which the SNGA raises revenue. One possibility would be to conform to the
text of Agenda 21 . According to this document, developed countries are supposed to contribute 0.7% of their GNP for
the purpose of environmental protection. For more details, see Rogers (1993, pp. 151-160). Second, r do not impose
a budget balance constraint on the SNGA's decision problem. This issue has been addressed in Batabyal (forthcoming).
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the SNGA indicating what it observed about the firm's pollution abatement capability parameter.
In some states, this monitoring device malfunctions, and, hence in these states, the government will
not be able to provide the SNGA with a useful report.

On receiving r, the SNGA offers the

government a transfer GiEIR+. Making the government's central task one of reporting is consistent
with the government/SNGA interaction proposed for one SNGA, the Commission on Sustainable
Development. As noted by Rogers (1993, p. 310), a key aspect of this interaction involves the
" ... Commission's ... considering information provided by governments .... "
The SNGA is risk-neutral and he has a welfare function which takes the form

U = ~/ a i

+ 8i -

Gi - T i), j = 1, ... , N, where j runs over the total number of countries. Clean

air produced in country j is xi

= aJ +

8 i . As stated, the SNGA's welfare is the difference between

total clean air and the sum of government and firm transfers. In the rest of this paper, I shall
suppress the country superscript; it is understood that the focus is on country j. The contract can
only be conditioned on what the SNGA actually observes, i.e., the government's report, r, and the
firm's production of clean air, x.
There are four states of nature, each occurring with probability Pi > 0, where ~i Pi = 1.
I shall consider ex ante and ex post contracting. In the ex ante case, the SNGA, the government, and
the fum sign the contract holding symmetric but imperfect information about 8. In the ex post case,
the signing of the contract takes place after the resolution of the uncertainty. The firm always
observes 8 before choosing its abatement level. The government, on the other hand, mayor may
not observe the firm's private information. This depends on whether the government's monitoring
device functions or malfunctions.

Hence, the government's signal, s, mayor may not be

informative. I can now characterize the four states as follows:

9

*State 1:

The firm and the government both observe

*State 2:

The firm observes

8 and the government observes nothing.

*State 3:

The firm observes

8 and the government observes nothing.

*State 4 :

The firm and the government both observe

8.

8.

In state 1, the firm and the government observe the low-abatement capability parameter. The

government's monitoring device works and hence yields useful information. In state 2, the firm
observes the low-abatement capability parameter, but the government observes nothing. In this state,
the government's monitoring device malfunctions. In state 3, the firm observes the high-abatement
capability parameter and the government observes nothing.
monitoring device malfunctions.

Once again, the government's

Finally in state 4, the firm and the government observe the

high-abatement capability parameter.
The timing of the game between the SNGA, the government, and the firm in the ex ante case
is as follows . First, the SNGA offers a contract to the government and the firm. Second, the firm
observes

e and the government receives its signal, s.

Third, the firm chooses abatement, a. Fourth,

clean air, x, is produced by the firm and the government sends its report, r, to the SNGA indicating
what it observed. Finally, the SNGA compensates the government and the firm with transfers,

G(x, r) and T(x, r) . When contracting is ex post, the uncertainty is resolved first and then the
contract is signed by the players.
I shall assume that the SNGA can verify the veracity of the government report, r . In other
words, if the government's signal, s, is noninformative, then the corresponding report, r, reflects that
fact and the SNGA can verify that the true facts are as they have been reported. In symbols,

s=0

==}

r = O. On the other hand, to keep the SNGA's design problem interesting and to allow for

10

the possibility of government/firm collusion, I shall permit the government to lie and report that its
signal is noninformative, when, in fact, such is not the case. That is,

S =

a => r E {a,

O}. This

completes my description of the model. I now consider the benchmark case in which perfect
information is acquired by the SNGA.

The First-Best Optimum
In this case, the SNGA observes the abatement capability parameter and the firm's pollution

abatement choice. Hence, the SNGA bypasses the government and contracts with the firm directly.
Since the government has no role to play, it receives its reservation transfer, Gr, and hence its
reservation utility, Vr , in all states.
necessary condition is g l ( a J

=

The SNGA solves

ma~ [a +

a -g( a)] .

The first-order

1, \fa. In other words, in the first-best optimum, the marginal

cost of pollution abatement is set equal to the SNGA's marginal welfare from abatement. The
optimal level of abatement, a* , is independent of the state. The firm receives a transfer for abating
pollution; this transfer too is independent of the state. The total monetary transfer equals, Tr + g+,
where Tr is the reservation transfer and g*
in which the SNGA cannot observe

==

g( a J. I now move on to the more interesting cases

a or the actual abatement undertaken by the firm.

4. THE NO-GOVERNMENTIFIRM COLLUSION CASE

Ex Ante Contracting
Since the contracting is ex ante, the SNGA, the government, and the firm share imperfect
but symmetric information about

a.

F or the time being, I shall disallow the possibility of

government/firm collusion. When the government is paid, G~ it obtains its reservation utility, Vr,
and hence it is fully insured. Further, since I am not allowing for collusion between the government

11
and the firm as yet, and, because the SNGA can verify the government's report by paying Gn the
SNGA obtains the government's information at least cost. This means that the three-tiered hierarchy
reduces to a two-tiered hierarchy in which the government plays a completely passive role.
The SNGA's problem now is to solve
max{Ti' }~\i1'P 1.(a 1. + e.1 - T)
1

(1)

Q i

~

- g( a2

-

Lle),

and (Ic)

Constraint (1a) is the firm's individual rationality constraint. Because the contracting is ex
ante, there is a single probabilistically weighted constraint. Constraints (1 b) and (1 c) are the firm's

incentive compatibility constraints.
information about
S,

e in these two states.

These constraints arise because the SNGA has imperfect
These are also the states in which the government's signal,

is noninformative. Constraint (1 b) says that in state 3, the firm should not claim that the state is

2. Similarly, (1 c) says that in state 2, the firm should not claim that the state is 3. I can now solve
the SNGA's problem as stated in (I)-(Ic). I am led to
Theorem 1:

The optimal IEA is one in which (i) the SNGA obtains the government's information
at least cost, (ii) the government's reward is Grin all states, (iii) the abatement levels
satisfy a 1 = a3 = a 4 = a * > a 2' (iv) the firm transfers satisfy

~

> Tl = T4 > T2 ,

and (v) all the constraints except (1 c) bind at the optimum.
Proof· See the Appendix.

Theorem 1 describes the pattern of abatement one may expect to observe in my stylized N
country world in which the SNGA contracts independently with the government and the firm in each
DC. Since the SNGA acquires the government's information in states 1 and 4 and because this

12

information is verifiable, the firm is required to abate pollution at the first-best level. The optimal
lEA then specifies equal rewards to the firm in these two states. On the other hand, when the state
is 2 or 3, the SNGA's information is imperfect. The optimal lEA now specifies a higher transfer in
state 3, to prevent the firm from lying about its true pollution abatement capability. The optimality
of the lEA stems in part from the feature that the SNGA rewards high pollution abatement with a
high transfer and "punishes" low pollution abatement with a low transfer. The level of abatement
in state 2 is lower than the level in the other states. This makes it less desirable to abate pollution
at a low level in state 3.

Ex Post Contracting
I now consider the case where the SNGA is unable to contract with the government and the
firm until the resolution of the uncertainty about the abatement capability parameter. Once again,
I shall disallow the possibility of government/firm collusion. With no collusion, the government
plays a passive role. It receives its reservation utility and hence it is fully insured. In this case, the
SNGA's problem is to solve
max{ a • T i } ~\;j'I P I.(a I. + 8 I. - T.)
I
i

subject to (2a) B[Ti - g(a)]

~

(2)

B r , \:Ii , and constraints (lb) and (I c).

As opposed to the ex ante case, in the ex post case, it must be individually rational for the
firm to contract with the SNGA in every state. As a result, the participation constraint must be
satisfied in each state. Further, this setting is characterized by asymmetrically held information.
That is, whereas the SNGA does not know the state of nature, the firm does. The timing of the game
now is such that the uncertainty is resolved first and then the players contract. The optimal contract
now has the properties stated in

13

Theorem 2:

The optimal ex post IEA is one in which (i) the SNGA obtains the government's
information at least cost, (ii) the government's transfer is G1" in all four states, (iii)

a l = a 3 = a 4 = a* > a 2 , (iv) T3 > TI = T4 > T2 , and (v) at the optimum, all the
constraints bind except (Ic) and (2a, for i = 3).

Proof· See the Appendix.
I now comment on some aspects of the optimal ex ante and ex post contracts. Inspecting
Table 1, we see that there is no material difference in the two IEAs. In particular, because the
government's report is verifiable, and because it does not collude with the firm, optimal insurance
for the firm in both IEAs require that TI = T4. Second, in these no-collusion cases, incentive
problems are limited to states 2 and 3. In these states, the optimal IEA must reward truth telling.
As such, in both IEAs we have T3 > T2 . Finally, in the ex ante and in the ex post IEAs, T3 > T1. This
is because, in both the contracting scenarios, the SNGA has to make a higher than zero profit
transfer in the favorable state (state 3) so as to preserve the incentive for the firm to not lie and abate
pollution at the level appropriate for state 2. Moreover, in the ex post case, in state 3, the incentive

TABLE 1: The No-GovernmentlFirm Collusion Case: Ex Ante versus Ex Post IEAs

No Collusion IEA

Ex Ante

Ex Post

Pollution abatement pattern

a=a
=a4 =a * >a2
-1
3

a=a
=a4 =a * >a2
-1
3

Transfer to the government
Transfers to the polluting firm

14
compatibility constraint is always more restrictive than the participation constraint. This explains
why the former constraint binds and the latter constraint is slack in equilibrium. I now consider the
effects of government/firm collusion on the optimal IEA designed by the SNGA.

5. THE GOVERNMENTIFIRM COLLUSION CASE

Ex Ante Contracting
Recall that because countries are sovereign, the SNGA is unable to either monitor the actions
of the government and the firm or enforce the terms of the IEA in the event of a contractual breach.
Since the SNGA can never acquire the firm's private information and must rely on the government's
report to design the optimal contract, an efficient contract must allow for and preclude the possibility
of the government and the firm colluding to maximize the transfers received from the SNGA. In
other words, an efficient contract must be individually rational, incentive compatible, and
collusion-proof.
I shall model collusion between the government and the firm as follows. In the ex ante case,
before the resolution of the uncertainty about abatement capability and at the time of signing the
contract between the SNGA, the government, and the firm, the firm and the government sign a side
}

contract which entails the offer of a bribe from the firm to its government. Naturally, this secondary
contract is unobservable by the SNGA. The bribe. b(- ,-), can only be conditioned on what the firm
and the government observe, i.e., the report, r, and clean air, x. With the offer and acceptance of this
bribe, the firm's transfer becomes {T(e) - b (r, x)} and the government's transfer becomes

{G(e) +b(r, x)} .

15
Collusion by the firm and the government alters the incentives of the various parties and, as
we shall see, the nature of the optimal contract offered by the SNGA. To see why the firm might
want to bribe its government, consider state 4. In this state, the government is indifferent between
reporting that it has observed

e and reporting that it has observed O.

However, the firm would

prefer that the government report O. This is one instance in which a clear rationale exists for the firm
to bribe its government.
In order to solve the SNGA's problem when there is collusion, I shall appeal to the
equivalence principle (Tirole, 1986, p. 195) and restrict myself to contracts that are collusion-proof
Tirole's method involves imposing constraints in addition to the usual participation and incentive
compatibility constraints for the government and the firm. These additional constraints are designed
to preclude government/firm collusion and hence make the main contract collusion-proof I can now
formulate the SNGA's problem. Denoting the collusion-proof transfers to the government and the
-

-

firm by G and T, the SNGA solves
max{G;r
- \Lv'I p I.(a.+8.-G
.-T.)I
i i,a I
I
I
I
-

subject to (1 a)-(1 c), (3a) LviPiV(G)
--

--

~

G4 + T4 - g(aJ ~ G 3 + T3 - g(a 3) , (3d)
}

-

-

-

Vr

,

(3)

-

(3b) G1 +T1-g(a1)

--

~

--

G2 +T2 -g(a2 ), (3c)

--

G3 + T3 - g(a3) ~ G 2 + T2 - g(a2 -~8), and (3e)

--

G2 + T2 - g (a 2) ~ G 3 + T3 - g (a 3 + ~8 ) .
Constraint (3a) is the government's participation constraint. Constraints (3b) and (3c) are
the core collusion constraints. Recall that in states 1 and 4, the government's signal, s, is
informative. In these two states, the government can hide this fact. Given this, constraints (3 b) and
(3 c) tell us that should the firm successfully bribe its government, the total sum of the transfers less
the cost of abatement in states 1 and 4 cannot be less than the corresponding totals in states 2 and

16

3, respectively.

Finally, constraints (3d) and (3e) tell us that it must not be possible for the

government to bribe the firm. More specifically, (3d) tells us that in state 3, the government should
not be able to bribe the firm to abate at the level that is appropriate for state 2. Similarly, (3e) tells
us that the government should not be able to bribe the firm to claim that the state is 3 when it is
actually 2. Solving the SNGA's problem (3) subject to (la)-(Ic), (3a)-(3e), I can state

Theorem 3:

The optimal IEA in the three-tiered hierarchy with government/firm collusion is one

.
In

w h'IC h (.)
I
a l = a 3 = a 4 = a* > a b

--

~

- -

(11.. )

-

-

-

-

G4 > G1 > G2 -- G3' (111
... )

- - - -

> T4 > Tl > ~, (iv) G4

+

T4

=

G3

+

T3 , and (v) all constraints except (Ic),

(3b), and (3e) bind at the optimum.

Proof' See the Appendix.
The first thing to note is that the SNGA is worse off when the government and the firm
collude. This is because, in the collusion case, the number of binding constraints exceeds the
number of binding constraints in the no-collusion case. However, if the SNGA does offer the IEA
with the characteristics described in Theorem 3, then his total monetary transfers cannot be altered
by changing the government's report or the firm's abatement level.
I now comment on some of the noteworthy features of the IEA described in Theorem 3.
From Theorem 3(i) and Table 2, we see that, like the no-collusion case, the first best level of
abatement can be required of the firm in states 1, 3, and 4. The optimal level of pollution abatement
in the low-abatement capability state is lower than the first best level. This tells us that collusion

per se has no effect on the pattern of equilibrium pollution abatement.
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TABLE 2: Ex Ante Contracting Without and With Collusion

IEA

Without Collusion

With Collusion

Pollution abatement pattern

a=a
=a4 =a * >a2
-1
3
-

Transfers to the government Gr

-

-

a=a
=a4 =a * >a2
-1
3
-

G4 > G1 > G2 = G3

Transfers to the polluting firm

Part (ii) and Table 2 tell us that, in the collusion case, the government is rewarded for the
usefulness of its report.

In states 2 and 3, the government reports truthfully. Thus, optimal

insurance requires that transfers to the government in these two states be equal. On the other hand,
in state 4, the government's reward must be high. A similar line of reasoning applies to state 1.
Further, the transfers in states 4 and 1 exceed those in states 2 and 3 because, in states 4 and 1, the
government may lie, and hence the SNGA has to create the right incentives to induce truth telling.
This is in contrast to the no-collusion case in which the government plays a passive role and receives
its reservation transfer in all four states.
Part (iv) tells us that the total transfers from the SNGA to the government and the firm in
states 3 and 4 are equal. However, by part (iii), the transfers to the firm between these two states
vary. Why is this so? In state 3, the firm can lie about the abatement capability parameter that it has
observed, and the government will not be able to tell the difference between truth telling and lying
because its signal is noninformative. In order to prevent lying, the firm's reward in state 3 must be
higher. In state 4, the government's signal is informative. Now the government has to be induced
to report truthfully with a higher transfer, and the firm's reward is correspondingly lower. From
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Table 2, we see that in the no-collusion case, T4 = T1, because the SNGA acquires the government's
verifiable information at least cost and because the government reports truthfully. On the other
hand, in the collusion case,

~

> T1 . This is because the SNGA must create incentives so that the

dual objectives of preventing collusion and encouraging the firm to act truthfully in the high
abatement capability state are achieved.
Finally, part (v) tells us that (3b) is slack at the optimum. This is because when the firm
observes the low-abatement capability parameter, the government's report does not make a
difference since the firm voluntarily prefers to abate pollution at the low level.

Ex Post Contracting
I now study the case in which there is government/firm collusion but where the SNGA is
unable to get the parties to contract until the uncertainty about the abatement capability parameter
-

has been resolved. I denote the government and the firm transfers by G and T, respectively. The
SNGA now solves
-

-

max {G i' f i ,a i } ~ \j"I p(a
. + 8 I -G I. - T)I
I
I

(4)

-

subject to (1b), (lc), (2a), (3b)-(3e), and (4a) V(G) ~ Vr , Vi. The optimal lEA has the properties
stated in
-

Theorem 4:

-

-

-

-

(i) a l = a3 = a 4 = a * > a2, (ii) G4 > G l = G 2 = G 3 = Gr , (iii) ~ > Tl > T2
---

--

---

--

and ~ > Tl > ~, (iv) G3 + T3 = G4 + T4~ G 4 - Gr = T3 - T4 , and (v) at the
optimum all the constraints bind except (1 c), (2a, for i = 3,4), (3 e), and (4a, for i = 4) .

Proof· See the Appendix.
A comparison of the optimal ex ante and ex post contracts with government/firm collusion
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can be made with the aid of Table 3. There are three essential differences. First, while the ex ante
-

-

-

-

-

--

-

contract specifies G4 > G 1 > G 2 = G 3' the ex post contract specifies G4 > Gl = G 2 = G3 = G ,..
In both cases, the government's signal is noninformative in states 2 and 3. Hence, the optimal ex
-

-

ante and ex post contracts specify G2

=

G 3' Further, in both cases the government can lie about

its signal in states 1 and 4. In order to induce truth telling by the government, the optimal contract
-

-

-

specifies G4 > G l' However, in the ex post case, Gl

-

=

G2

·

This is because in both these states

the participation constraints bind at the optimum. Second, in the ex ante case

~

> T4 > Tl > T2,

whereas in the ex post case ~ > Tl > T2 and ~ > Tl > ~. In both cases, a*
-

such, both contracts specify

r;.

case, a direct comparison of

~

-

-

> T2 · Note that whereas in the ex ante case

~

=

a l > a2· As

-

> T4 , in the ex post

-

-

and

~

cannot be made. This is because the participation constraints

in these two states are slack in equilibrium. 14

Third, while in the ex ante case, three

constraints-(lc), (3b), and (3e)-are slack in the optimum; in the ex post case, five
constraints-(lc) (2a, for i = 3,4) , (3e), and (4a, for i = 4)-are slack. This tells us that the SNGA
will prefer ex ante contracting to ex post contracting when there is government/firm collusion.
Finally consider Table 4, which describes the differences in the optimal ex post IEA, without
and with collusfon. We see that collusion has no impact on the pattern of equilibrium abatement.
In both scenarios, the government earns its reservation transfer in three of the four states. This is
because, in the no-collusion case, the government plays a passive role. In the collusion case, the
government's active role notwithstanding, the government typically earns no rents because three of
the four participation constraints bind. In the no-collusion case, the passive government's reward
in state 4 is Gr As contrasted to this, in the collusion case, the SNGA precludes collusion in state 4

14Also see the Appendix for step 11 in the proof of Theorem 4.
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TABLE 3: The GovernmentlFirm Collusion Case: Ex Ante versus Ex Post Contracting

lEA

Ex Ante

Ex Post

Pollution abatement pattern

a=a
=a4 =a * >a2
-1
3

a=a
=a4 =a * >a2
-1
3

Transfers to the government

G4 > G1 > G2 = G3

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

G>G=G=G=G
4
1
2
3
r

Transfers to the polluting firm

-

SNGA's total transfers in states

-

-

G4 + T4 = G3 + T3 -

3 and 4

TABLE 4: Ex Post Contracting Without and With Collusion

lEA

Without Collusion

With Collusion

Pollution abatement pattern

a=a
=a4 =a * >a2
-1
3

Transfers to the government

G>G=G=G=G
4
1
2
3
r

-

-

-

-

Transfers to the polluting firm

-

by setting G4 > G r' Along the same lines, the SNGA alters the firm transfers in the collusion case,
When there is no collusion, Tl = T4 , In the collusion case, the SNGA makes the optimal lEA
-

collusion-proof by setting

-

T:t > T1 ,
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6. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper I analyzed the question of environmental protection for developing countries
within the framework of the directives set forth in the agreements reached at the 1992 Rio Earth
Summit. I modeled the institutional setting for the underlying problem as a three-tiered hierarchy
with N forks, and then I studied the nature of the optimal ex ante and ex post lEAs, without and with
collusion. A number of policy conclusions emerge.
First, the pattern of pollution abatement is generally insensitive to the form of contracting.
That is, irrespective of whether contracting is ex ante or ex post, and irrespective of whether there
is collusion, the first best level of abatement can be required by the SNGA in three of the four states.
In a practical setting, this tells us that the contractual procedure and the SNGA's inability to monitor

the actions of the government and the firm make no difference to the basic design question as long
as the SNGA can (i) get individual nations to participate in the contracting process, and (ii) create
incentives so that the relevant parties reveal their private information truthfully. Indeed, this paper
suggests that problems stemming from an SNGA's lack of monitoring and enforcement powers are
far less significant than is generally believed. Alternately put, national sovereignty appears to be
less of an issue ;than is commonly believed. As I have shown, in a number of circumstances, the
pattern of pollution abatement is almost ideal.
Second, the SNGA will, in general, prefer ex ante contracting to ex post contracting. This
IS

because ex ante contracting (i) is characterized by symmetric, as opposed to asymmetric,

information, and (ii) involves fewer binding constraints. However, it should be noted that, in the
context of Des, unless the SNGA can limit the ex post liability of the players, nations may well
refuse to participate in ex ante contracting schemes.
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Third, as compared to the ex ante transfers, the ex post transfers are somewhat more difficult
to pin down definitively. Several observers, such as Rogers (1993 , p. 236), have worried that many
of the Earth Summit directives ". . . offer a back door option by which signatories can excuse
themselves at a later date if the going gets too tough." The implementability of ex post contracts
should diminish such concerns because an ex post contract is like a limited liability contract. In this
sense, as compared to an ex ante contract, an ex post contract is more likely to be
renegotiation-proof
Fourth, by making the contracting process country specific, particularly the award of
transfers, I have emphasized the heterogeneity of developing regions (countries). However, this
approach precludes the possibility of holding similar regions (countries) to similar environmental
standards. Further, by not imposing a budget balance on the SNGA's decision problem, I have
finessed the possibility of Des competing among themselves for a greater share of the SNGA's
budget for environmental protection. To address these aspects of the problem adequately, one would
have to model the lEA design problem in a framework which permits relative performance
evaluation. A start in this direction has been made in Batabyal (forthcoming).
With talk of rising disparity between the developing and the developed countries, and the
increasingly acrimonious nature of international discussions regarding the use of environmental
resources, the design question studied in this paper takes on particular significance. This is in no
small measure due to the fact that the implementation of such mechanisms will do more to engender
and maintain international security than will most strategic or unilateral policy measures.
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APPENDIX

In this appendix, I provide the proofs of Theorems 1 and 4. Both proofs involve the
Kuhn-Tucker analysis. The proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 are available from the author on request.

Proof of Theorem 1: I shall proceed by means of five steps. Omitting (1 c) temporarily, the
Lagrangian for problem (1) is

Sf

~Vi Pi (a i +8i-Ti)+a~ViPiB[Ti-g(a)]-Br}+ P{T3 -g(a)- T2+g(a2 -il8)}, (AI)

=

where a and

P are the multipliers corresponding to (Ia) and (Ib), respectively.

For i

=

1,3,4, this

Lagrangian depends on ai only through (ai - Ti ) and {Ti - g (a i )}. Thus, for i = 1,3,4, it suffices
to maximize {ai - g( a)} over ai' This yields gl (a) = 1 ==> (g I rI( 1) = a * = ai' i = 1,3,4 . The
remaining first-order conditions are (Ala) a{ aB[ e]1 aTI
(Alc)
1+

a{aB[e]/aT3}=1-P1P3'

{P IP2 }g I (a2 - il8)

= { 1+

(AId)

}

=

1, (Alb) a{ aB[e ]/aT2}

a{aB[e]/a~}=I ,

=

and

1 + PIP2'
(Ale)

PIP2 }g I ( a2).

Step 1: At the optimum, (1 b) binds.

Proof" Suppose not. Substituting

P=

0 in (Ale), we see that the first-best optimum results. But

this is incentive incompatible for the firm . Thus,

P> O.•

Step 2: a2 < a *.
J

Proof" (Ale) tells us that gl (a 2) < 1. But gil ( e) > 0 and gl( a) = 1, i = 1,3,4, ==>a2 < a*. •
Step 3: Tl = T4 .

Proof" This follows from a comparison of (Ala) and (AId) .•
Step 4: T3 > T2 .

Proof" From step 1,
~ >

P> O.

This, combined with the fact that

a2 ==> g( a3) > g( a2 - il8)

==>

T3 > T2 · •
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Step 5: T3 > T1.

Proof' Compare (Ala) and (Alc), recalling that CB[ e ]/a Ti > 0, and that
{( 1/ a) - (PI aP3 )} > O. •
Finally, I have to show that (lc) is satisfied.

g(a3 +

~ 8)

- g ( a3 ) > g (a2) - g (a 2 -

~ 8) .

This is equivalent to showing that

This last inequality holds because ~ > a2 , Lfl > 0,

gl(e ) > 0, and g Il ( e ) > O. This completes the proof of Theorem 1. ••

Proof of Theorem 4: I shall proceed by means of eleven steps. Omitting (lc) and (3e) temporarily,
the Lagrangian to problem (4) is
~ =

-

-

-

J; - g( a3) - T2 + g ( a2 - ~ 8)}

P{

--

~{G4

-

Lvi Pi(ai + 8i - Gi - T) + ~Vi ai{B [Ti - g(a)] - B r } + ~ Vi Di {V( G) - Vr } +
+ EI { G I + TI -

g (a I) - G2 - T2 + g ( a2) } +

(A2)

- - - -

--

+T4 -g(a4) -G3 -T3 +g(a 3)} +K{G3+T3-g(a3)-G2-T2+g(a2-~8)},

where the ai' the

Di

p, Eb E 2, and K are the multipliers corresponding to (2a), (4a), (lb), (3b), (3c),

and (3d), respectively. As in the proof of Theorem 1, for i
first-order

(D!P 2) V/( (

are

conditions
2)

(DIP J VI (G4 )

= 1 +( EI +K YP 2,

(A2a)

:1=

2, I get q = a * ' The remaining nine

(DI /PI)V I

(GI )

(D 3/P 3) V /( G3) = 1

(A2c)

= 1 - EI/PI '

(A2b)

YP 3'

(A2d)

+ (E2 - K

-

= 1 -

4P4,

(A2e)

-

(a2IP2){aB[e]/aT2 } = 1 +(P+

(al/p I) { aB[ e]1 aTI

= 1-

}

E /Pl'

(A2f)

-

EI +

K)IP2 ,(A2g) (a 3IP3){aB[e]/aT3 } = 1

+(E2

-P-K)/P3'

-

(A2h)

(a 4IP4) {aB[e ]/aT4 }

=

1 - E2/P 4'

Proof· From (A2i) it follows that g /( a2) < 1 => a2 < a*.•
Step 2: Constraints (1 b) and (3 d) bind at the optimum.

and (A2i)
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p > 0, and that K> 0.

Proof· I have to show that
(i)

Suppose not. There are four cases to consider:

P= 0, (ii) P> 0, K = 0, (iii) P= K = 0, and (iv) p > 0, K> 0.

{I -gl(a2 )}/ {gl(a2 ) -g l(a2 -Ll8)} =
(A2k) K =

P2 {

Now (A2i) can be written as (A2j)

If case (i) were true, thenfrom(A2j) I get

{P+K}/P2'

1 - g I(a2 ) } / {g I (a2 ) - g I (a 2 - Ll8) }. If, on the other hand, case (ii) were true, then

(A2I) are equal, we must have

p=

K. This rules out cases (i) and (ii). If case (iii) were true, then

the first-best optimum would result. However, this outcome is incentive-incompatible for the firm;
hence, case (iii) is ruled out. I conclude that

p > 0, and that K> O.•

Step 3: Constraint (4a, for i = 3) binds at the optimum.
Proof· I have to show that

v3

> 0. Suppose not. Then

v3

=

°and (A2c) imply that K

=

P3

+E2·

-

Using this value ofK in (A2g), I get ~ = -p/aB[e ]/aT3 < 0 . However, this is impossible; hence,

-

-

Step 4: At the optimum, G2
Proof· Using p > 0, K> 0,

G3

=

=

Gr·

°with (3d) gives the claimed result. G
-

V3>

2 =

Gr means that v 2 > 0. •

+E I +

K), which is impossible

Step 5: Constraint (2a, for i = 2) binds at the optimum.
Proof· I have to show that ct2 >
irrespective of whether

EI Z

o. From (A2f)

~

=

°

~P2 = -

(P

0 . Thus ct2 > O. •

Step 6: Constraint (2a, for i = 3) is slack at the optimum.
Proof·

p> 0, ct2 > 0

-

tell us that

-

I; - g( a3 ) = T2 - g ( a2 ) + { g (a 2) - g( a2 - Ll8 ) } = 7',. + { D }, D > 0 .

-

In turn this tells us that

I; - g(a 3) > Tr ~

ct3 = 0. •

Step 7: Constraints (2a, for i = 1) and (4a, for i = 1) bind in equilibrium.
Proof· (A2a) says that

EI = VI

=

°cannot hold. (A2a) and (A2e) say that either (i) £1

= VI

=

°
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or (ii) a l >

°

and

> 0. If (i) holds, then (3b) is slack and

VI

EI

= 0. But this is impossible. Hence,

the claimed result follows. -

Step 8: Constraints (2a, for i = 4) and (4a, for i = 4) are slack at the optimum.

Proof· (A2d) and (A2h) say that either (i) a4 >
(3c) is violated. Thus a4
-

-

=

-

°and v > °or (ii) a

v4

4 =

4

=

0 . If (i) holds, then

v4 = 0 . -

Step 9: G4 > G I = G2 = G3 = Gr·

Proof· This follows from the facts that
-

-

-

-

-

VI

> 0,

V2

> 0,

> 0, and v4 = 0. -

V3

-

Step 10: ~ > TI > T2 and ~ > T;. > T2·

Proof·

The

claimed

result

holds

q > 0, a2 > 0, a3

because

-

Step 11: At the optimum, (3 b) binds; (3 c) binds iff G4

Proof
-

G4

-

-

thatG4 -G r =

-

= G3

-

+ T3 - g(a3 )

-

T3 -T4 ·

and the facts

=

0,

and

--

= ~ - ~.

Gr

-

Constraint (3b) binds because q > 0, a2 > 0,

+ T4 - g(a4 )

a4

~

-

VI

> 0, and v2 > 0.

= a4 =

v4

=

--T4 ,

~

=

It is easy to verify that G4 - Gr = T3

° and
a4

The statement
v3

>

° tell

us

= v 4 = 0, andv3 >0

tell us that (3 c) binds. I now have to show that (Ic) and (3e) are satisfied. The fact that (Ic) is satisfied can be
verified in a manner analogous to that used in the proof of Theorem 1. Given that ( 1c) is satisfied,
-

to see that (3e) is satisfied, note that from Step 9, G2
4. --

-

=

G3 · This completes the proof of Theorem

